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Preface

T

HIS BOOK BRINGS together papers presented at the very successful 2013 ILA Regional Conference held in Sounion, Athens on
29-31 August 2013.
The Conference took place against the backdrop of political, social and
economic stability, despite the pervasive underlying problems, and resulted
in a successful exchange of views and knowledge. It also served as a meeting point of both people and ideas. Lawyers and academics from all over the
world, both established figures as well as young researchers, came together
and discussed a great variety of issues ranging from philosophical aspects of
the rule of law in relation to international law to technical rules of trade law.
The quality of all the papers presented was of such a high level that the
need was felt to publish not only the proceedings of the conference but a book.
Thirty conference participants revised and submitted their papers for publication, making contributions of great value, and closing a gap in the existing
literature. The book addresses important current and cross-cutting issues that
have not been adequately dealt with together or in an interdisciplinary manner.
Moreover, all of the issues are of relevance both academically as well as to
practitioners of public and private international law.
The contributions are organised into three main parts. The first addresses
the contemporary challenges of global governance, shedding light both on the
actors and processes as well as on the structures and factors of the international
community. The second deals with resources in a novel way, approaching it
both from the viewpoint of the preservation of the past, looking into cultural
heritage, while also according the requisite importance to sharing and maintaining the future through a disciplined approach to natural resources. Finally,
the last part explores investment and trade from various angles.
It is hoped that this book will help map out interactions of interrelated
topics that are slowly coming to occupy the centre stage of the international
law discourse.
Professor Christos Gortsos
Vice President Hellenic Branch ILA
Chairman, Organising Committee
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Between Flexibility and
Stability: Ad Hoc Procedures
and/ or judicial Institutions?
CHIARA GIORGETTP

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE CHOICE BETWEEN the flexibility offered by ad hoc procedures and the stability proper of established judicial institutions
poses many interesting questions for those interested in international
dispute resolution. This chapter seeks to assess some of these questions and,
possibly, to offer suggestions to future parties and their counsel on how to
select the most appropriate resolution mechanism to resolve their international
inter-state dispute. I
To begin with, it is worth noting two important and related trends that
characterize contemporary international dispute resolution: first, the increased
use of international litigation by diverse international actors, and second, the
multiplication of dispute resolution mechanisms.
Indeed, there has been a proliferation of judicial bodies in the international
community. More, and more diverse international forums are available to parties. Recently created international judicial bodies include the International
Criminal Court, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. At the same time, more
of these forums have a very specialized jurisdiction, including the dispute
• Associate Professor of Law, Rid1111ond Law School. The author would like to thank the
organizers and the participants to the 2013 Regional Conference of the 1-lellcnic Branch of
the International Law Association for their support and comments. I am also grateful to Saud
Aldawsari of Richmond Law School for his research and editorial assistance. Email: cgiorgct@
richmond.cdu.
1
In general, sec C Giorgctti (cd), The Rules, Practice and ]urispmdence of International
Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). Sec also L Malintoppi, 'Methods of
Dispute Resolution in Inter-state Litigation: When States Go to Arbitration rather than Adjudication' (2006) S(l) Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 133.
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mechanism of the World Trade Organization, the European Court of Human
Rights and the arbitration mechanism under the International Convention for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention).
States, the principal actors in the international legal community, are increasingly involved in international litigations. This can be explained simply by
observing that, as a result of post-cold war fragmentation, there are more
states that have ever growing reciprocal obligations and responsibilities, which
in turn create more opportunities for disputes. 2
In many instances, states act as respondents in international litigation-for
example, in investment arbitration or human rights litigation-and so do not
have a choice on the forum at the time of each dispute-the choice having
been made (usually by treaty) beforehand. However, in inter-state situations,
where states are in a position to choose between different forums, how should
they decide where to go?
The classic dichotomy is between the flexibility that ad hoc arbitral tribunals offer and the stability provided by standing judicial institutions, like the
International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court).
Ad hoc bodies and judicial institutions include a variety of diverse bodies,
including:

/

I

• judicial bodies that are permanent structures, like the ICJ and ITLOS,
which have a variety of subject matter jurisdictions;
quasi-judicial bodies, including institutionalized and non-institutionalized
arbitral tribunals. The Slovenia/Croatia maritime boundary arbitration
presently litigated under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an example of the first, 3 the boundary dispute resolved by the
Taba arbitration between Egypt and Israel an example of the second; 4 and
• other diverse ad hoc bodies, like the United Nations Claims Commission
(UNCC), 5 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundaries and Claims Commissions 6 and

2
Sec T Buergcmhal, 'Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?'
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 267.
J Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, Arbitration Agreement of 4 November 2009, available at http://www.pcacascs.com/wcb/view/3 (accessed 10 February
2016).
4 Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taha Arca (Egypt/Isr) (1988) 27 ILM 1421; sec CS
Copeland, 'The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes' (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review
3073, available at http:l/ir.lawnct.fordham.cdu/cgi/vicwcontcnt.cgi?articlc=3585&context=flr
(accessed on 12 February 2016).
5 The UN Claims Commission was created by the UN Security Council for claims for compensation arising out of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and brought by individuals, private
companies, international organizations and states against Iraq. Sec, in general, TJ Feighery, 'The
United Nations Compensation Commission; in Giorgetti (n 1 above).
6 Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed in August 2000 to resolve their boundary dispute and claims
arising from the 1998-2000 war by binding international arbitration. The !'CA served as registry
to both arbitrations. Sec BO Daly, 'Permanent Court of Arbitration' in Giorgetti (n 1 above); sec
also the PCA Case Repository, at http://www.pcacascs.com/web/ (accessed on 12 February 2016).
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the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, created to address and resolve a specific dispute.7
When states decide to litigate their legal differences, different factors come into
play that can move the balance in favour of arbitration or judicial institution.
This chapter aims to highlight some of the factors that should be taken into
consideration when choosing an international dispute settlement mechanism.

II. FLEXIBILITY V STABILITY: THE ABILITY TO
CHOOSE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

One of the main differences between permanent judicial bodies and ad hoc
institutions is the ability of the parties in ad hoc arbitrations to directly choose
members of the adjudicative body charged to hear their dispute.
At the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and the paramount example of an international judicial body, judges are elected by the
UN General Assembly and the Security Council for a renewable term of nine
years. The 15 judges who make up the Court are recognized international
law experts and represent different legal cultures, as well as geographical and
(increasingly) gender diversity. 8
The method of selection can be mitigated. Occasionally, parties also have
the possibility of choosing their judge at the ICJ. This can happen when there
is no judge of the same nationality of the parties. In that case, the state that
does not have a 'national judge' can select an ad hoc judge to hear the case
and join the other members of the Court. Similarly, parties can ask to have
their case heard by a five-member chamber. In that-rare-occasion, parties
can suggest certain members of the Court and their opinion carry considerable weight in the final decision.
Conversely, in arbitration, parties always choose at least some of the members of the tribunal. Generally, arbitration panels are constituted by three
arbitrators, each party selecting one arbitrator and the third-and presiding-arbitrator being selected either by the two parties themselves or by an
appointing authority. In more complex cases, such as many boundary disputes,
the arbitral tribunal may be constituted of five members, and the mechanism
for selection generally docs not change. Each party selects two arbitrators,
and the presiding arbitrator is chosen either by agreement between the two
parties or by a designated appointing authority. This selection process affords

7 The Iran-US Claims Tribunals was created in 1981 by agreement of the parties through the
mediation of Algeria to hear individual and sovereign claims between Iran and the US. Sec, in
general, .JK Sharpe, 'Iran-United States Claims 1i·ibunal' in Giorgetti (n 1 above).
8 Sec !CJ Statute, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?p I =4&p2=2&p3=0 (accessed
12 i'cbruary 2016). On the !CJ in general sec also SD Murphy, 'The International Court of Justice' in Giorgctti (n I above).

14

Chiara Giorgetti

parties the possibility of choosing arbitrators with specific qualities, including
expertise, legal background and languages spoken.
The ability to choose arbitrators is consistently seen by parties as a fundamental feature in favour of arbitration. Parties consistently report that the
ability to appoint an arbitrator in international arbitration is a key reason for
them to choose that mechanism.

III. FLEXIBILITY ON RULES OF PROCEDURES

A particular advantage of arbitration over international judicial institutions
is that parties can choose their own rules of procedures if they so wish, and
tailor them to the specific needs of a specific case.
To a certain extent, this can also be done at the ICJ with a compromisbut some rules would still apply in ICJ proceedings (including, for example,
Articles 62 and 63 ICJ Statute on third-party intervention, and Article 41
Statute on provisional measures 9 ).
At the same time, drafting detailed procedural rules is time consuming
and complex, and requires expert counsel. Parties and their counsel need to
consider many issues, including schedule, possible bi- or tri-furcation of proceedings, sequence and timing of pleadings, organization of proceedings, rules
of evidence (including those applying to witnesses), logistical aspects, language, translation of documents and challenges of arbitrators.
Most often, parties in ad hoc proceedings apply the UNCITRAL Rules. 10
The paragraphs below highlight some of the procedural issues in which the
choice of the parties in respect of a specific forum matters most.

(
A. Length of Proceedings
The ICJ is often criticized because of the length of its proceedings. The practice of the court has been to fix fairly long time limits for the filing of written
pleadings. For example, in the Oil Platforms case 1l-filed by Iran in 1992
against the United States-the hearings were held in 2002 and the judgment
on the merits rendered in 2003 (11 years after the case was initially filed). One
important consideration is that even at the ICJ the parties can, to a large
extent, decide the timetable of the proceedings. There are, however, more
procedural constraints, for example third party intervention.
Conversely, parties can really speed up proceedings if they so choose. This
9

All available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?pl =4&p2=2&p3=0.
Available at http://pca-cpa.orp/showpagc.asp?pa(Lid= 1064.
11 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of lra11 v United States of America), a timclinc of the
case, as well as all the decisions, is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=3&cas
e=90&c.:ode=op&p3=4.
10
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happened in the Eritrea/Yemen maritime dispute and Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary proceedings, in which the parties opted for a particularly expedite schedule:
1. Eritrea/Yemen: 11 months for simultaneous exchange of memorials, two
months for the replies, three months after that oral proceedings were held.
The tribunal was asked to, as far as possible, deliver the award within three
months from the end of the oral proceedings. The entire arbitration took
only three years.12
2. The Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission was also organized on a tight
schedule, which the parties respected-three months to file simultaneous
memorials, three months for an exchange of counter-memorials and one
month for replies. The award was issued by the tribunal equally expeditiously.13

In other cases the parties have also decided to request the tribunal to issue
the award within a limited amount of time and have imposed specific time
limits on the tribunal.

B. Terms of Reference of the Tribunal
In ad hoc proceedings, parties can agree on specific terms of reference for the
arbitral tribunal, which establish the issues to be decided by the tribunal. At
the ICJ, this can be done at the time when the parties submit their dispute
to the ICJ through a mutually agreed conzpromis.

C. Number and Types of Parties
Ad hoc proceedings allow unique flexibility in terms of the number of parties that can be brought into proceedings. For example, at the UNCC, Iraq
was a sui generis respondent in cases brought by individuals, international
organizations and states, and cases involved mass claims as well as single and
multi-party claims.

IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY AND PUBLICITY

One important difference between international ad hoc proceedings and proceedings in judicial institutions is confidentiality of proceedings. At the ICJ
and in other established proceedings, hearings are open to the public and all
submissions-written and oral-as well as all of the Court's decisions, are

12
13

In general, sec PCA Past Cases (n 6 above).
Ibid.
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published and readily available from the ICJ website once the hearings are
finished.
Conversely, in ad hoc proceedings, parties can choose to keep some (eg written pleadings or oral pleadings) or all of the proceedings confidential. Indeed,
the existence of the entire dispute could be kept confidential. This could be of
interest especially for politically sensitive issues or to limit possible drawbacks
for payments of any future award.
Thus, in sensitive cases, arbitration may be preferable. Parties can decide if
and what to open to the public-like the parties choose to do in the Abey Arbitration between Sudan and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/ Army. 14
In a recent arbitration between the US and Ecuador, the parties agreed to
make the pleadings public, but not the award.15

V. FLEXIBILITY ON APPLICABLE LAW

Parties in ad hoc proceedings also have a certain flexibility to determine the
applicable law to their dispute.
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides the generally recognized enumeration
of sources of law for international disputes. It provides that:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply;
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.16

In special cases, parties can direct the tribunal to use a specific body of law.
For example, in the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute, the parties asked the
tribunal to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty borders between them
based on the pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable
international law.17
The flexibility to determine the applicable law can be an important argument in favour of ad hoc arbitration in certain cases in which the parties have
a predetermined and agreed body of law that they wish to apply. However,
choosing the applicable law is no simple matter, and may not be preferable
in many other contests.
14

Ibid.
Documents for both proceedings arc available at the website of the l'CA, ibid, which acted
as registry in both cases.
16
Art 38, !CJ Statute, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documcnts/?p 1=4&p2=2&p3=0
17
For the award and arbitration agreement sec l'CA Past Cases (n 6 above).
I.I
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VI. FLEXIBILITY V. STABILITY: THE BINDING NATURE OF THE
AWARD, ENFORCEABILITY AND POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES

Judgments and awards are always final and binding for the parties. Critics,
however, point out that international law lacks an enforcement mechanism
similar to the police force found in domestic law. The truth is that, as Louis
Henkin famously wrote in 1979, 'almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time' . 18 Equally, parties to international disputes respect and apply the final
decisions rendered by an international court or tribunal almost of all the time.
All parties have a mutual advantage in respecting international judicial decisions. They are, of course, also legally obligated to do so by international law,
whether as members of the United Nation or by the agreement they signed to
go to arbitration. Failure to comply, therefore, can result in state responsibility for international law violation.
The UN Charter provides at Article 94 that parties must 'comply with the
decision of the IC]' and
if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under the
IC] judgment, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendation or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgmenr. 19

Thus, the Security Council can be called upon to play a role in enforcing an
ICJ judgment. An important problem, however, is the exercise of a veto by
one of the veto-holding members of the Security Council, which could block
any enforcement effort. Famously, for example, the US used its veto power to
block the enforcement of an ICJ judgment in a case that Nicaragua brought
against the us. 20
This is more problematic in arbitration, which lacks an immediate link to
the Security Council. A reference to an enforcing role of the United Nations
could, and should, be included in the terms of reference of the tribunal.
Where enforceability may be problematic from the start, established judicial
bodies like the ICJ may thus present an advantage.
Established judicial bodies are also preferable when tribunals are needed
after the judgment is issued, for example if a clarification, correction or interpretation is needed by the parties. In arbitration, the arbitral tribunal ceases
to exist after the award is issued, making it difficult for it to reconvene to
hear a post-award request. Differently, the statute of the ICJ includes specific
provisions for such situations, thus providing added stability.
18

L Henkin, How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, 1979).
Art 94, UN Charter, available at http://www.un.org.
Military and l'ammilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nie v USA)-IC.J .Judgment
of 27 June 1986. I'or the cxcn.:isc of the veto power, sec UN Security Council, draft resolution,
UN Doc S/18428, 28 October 1986, vetoed by the US; UN Security Council meeting 2718, verbatim record, in UN Doc S/PV.2718, 28 October 1986.
19
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VII. CONCLUSION

International dispute resolution nowadays offers a real menu of options to
prospective litigants. The choice of forum in international litigation is a fundamental decision, with important repercussions for the parties. Any such
decision must therefore be carefully considered by the parties.
Different forums have different functions and may appeal to different litigants. In general, international dispute resolution is quite flexible and parties
have substantial freedom.
Flexibility can play an important role when parties agree to settle their dispute by a binding international law mechanism, and parties can choose specific
rules of procedures and applicable law, and-most importantly-have a say
on who decides their dispute by selecting members of the tribunal directly. To
go to arbitration, states must recognize the existence of a legal dispute and
be willing to have it resolved through arbitration.
Standing tribunals like the ICJ have important and unique functions: they
provide for compulsory jurisdiction and their public forum may validate decisions for domestic constituencies. Judgments of standing tribunals may also
result in better enforceability.
Sometimes, of course, there is no choice, as there is no standing forum
that has jurisdiction over the specific dispute. Also, sometimes (albeit rarely)
there is only limited choice-a dispute resolution clause may only allow for
one forum. In certain situations, arbitration may also be the only option. For
example, Article 287 UNCLOS provides that if a party has not chosen by a
written statement one of the three settlerrr~nt methods listed or if the parties
have not chosen the same method, the dispute will be resolved by arbitration.
Cost is also always an important consideration, as arbitration can be much
more costly then the ICJ, where the cost of the court and the registry is not
paid by the parties.

